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Security model

A public summary of what ATP trusts, what it does not, and how each risk is reduced.

This page summarizes the trust assumptions behind ATP 2.4.0 and the controls that limit each risk. It is a summary of design intent, not a security certification. ATP has not passed an independent whole-protocol audit. See Conformance and release gates.

Implementation candidate

Security goals

AreaGoal
Escrowed fundsNo loss, duplicate payout or payout to the wrong recipient
Atom lifecycleNo replay, skipped step or change after finalization
DisputesA person who opens a dispute cannot choose the payout
RootsA payer, delegate or keeper can never become a root or redirect a refund
DelegationNo action, value or time limit can be bypassed
ConfigurationChanges apply to future Atoms only

Who is trusted

ATP gives no single actor discretionary control over an outcome.

ActorCanCannot
Buyer or Seller rootTake its own lifecycle actions, open a dispute, sign one side of a decisionAct as the other side or choose a disputed payout alone
GovernanceActivate and retire configurations, manage the fee policy, unpause creationRewrite a live Atom's terms
PauserPause new creation, disable a token for new AtomsUnpause, or stop an existing Atom's settlement
Award committee memberSign an independent award. Two of three members form a quorumDecide alone or move funds
Anyone (keeper)Relay valid packages, run timeouts, pay fixed-recipient fee claimsChoose terms, redirect a fee or bypass timing

Sinera also runs separate approval, execution and case authorities. Each has a narrow job. For example, the case authority can attest filing metadata but cannot choose a payout.

Main mitigations

  • Signed intents. Signatures bind the chain, the contract, the policy and the 2.4.0 domain. A signature has an explicit expiry. Roots can be ordinary wallets or ERC-1271 contract wallets.
  • Exact callers. Settlement accepts only the immutable, configured caller, so a role change cannot substitute a new one.
  • Atomic finalization. Case consumption, final state, payouts and fee claims succeed together or revert together.
  • Fixed fees per Atom. Fee rates and treasuries are signed at creation and cannot change afterward.
  • Exact accounting. The vault checks every transfer and keeps unpaid fee claims out of any emergency withdrawal.
  • No dispute powers for delegates. Sessions have no dispute action. See Delegation sessions.
  • Authority separation. Roots must differ from every authority address and from every committee member. Authority addresses must be deployed contracts, not wallets using EIP-7702 delegation.
  • Fail-closed configuration. Replacing a configuration is a fresh deployment. Old modules stay in settle-only mode until all their Atoms, escrows and claims are cleared.

Residual risks

ATP lists these limits openly.

Known limits

These risks remain even when every check passes.

  • Committee control. Two compromised or colluding committee members can sign any protocol-valid award. Three wallets owned by one party are one effective controller, not three independent arbitrators.
  • Contract wallets. A contract wallet can change its internal rules behind a fixed address. Operators must keep monitoring them.
  • No unconditional liveness. If the committee is unavailable, the parties never agree, and nobody relays, a dispute can leave escrow locked indefinitely.
  • Token risk. A token issuer can pause, blacklist, seize or rebase. That can strand escrow, even though disabling a token blocks only new Atoms.
  • Module provenance. On-chain checks cannot prove that a configured module's code is honest. Exact deployed bytecode must be verified separately.
  • Signing time. The chain proves a signature is valid when executed. It does not prove when it was signed.
  • Fee wallet. A fee claim paid to an external wallet is outside ATP accounting. The wallet's own controller decides what happens next.
  • Public metadata. Receipts store commitments, not documents. Hashes and counterparty addresses are public.

What integrators should do

  1. Show the payer separately from the Buyer and refund beneficiary.
  2. Show gross awards and net payouts separately, including dispute fees on full refunds.
  3. Treat a successful advanceCase call as progress, not as finality.
  4. Check the chain, token, active configuration and vault address exactly before signing.
  5. Use short signature expiries and watch for submissions.

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