Intent is not authority
How Roots, delegation sessions and agent limits work, and why a skill, prompt or MCP result never counts as authorization.
Wanting something to happen is not the same as being allowed to make it happen. Sinera keeps these apart. A prompt, a plan, a skill result or a tool response can express intent. Only a Root, acting through the protocol, can grant authority.
Implementation candidate
This page describes ATP 2.4.0 behavior. ATP 2.4.0 is an implementation candidate and is deployed publicly on BSC Testnet only.
Who can act
ATP keeps application identity and commercial authority apart:
application account != Root wallet != payer != delegate or operator| Role | What it is |
|---|---|
| Root wallet | The Buyer or Seller principal recorded in an Atom. It can be a normal wallet or a contract wallet. |
| Payer | Supplies the escrow funds and calls the creation entry point. Paying does not make the payer the Buyer Root or the refund beneficiary. |
| Session delegate | The exact address a Root authorized in one delegation session. |
| Operator | May trigger one bound purchase path on a prefunded executor. The executor, not the operator, is the delegate and payer. |
Login IDs, linked-wallet records, funding status, prompts, schedules and webhook payloads are application state. None of them is ATP authority.
What a Root can delegate
Only the Root can create its own session. A session binds one Root, one exact delegate, one configuration and one settlement token. It can also limit the counterparty, object, asset, time range, value, and per-period or lifetime spending.
ATP 2.4.0 defines five delegable actions:
| Action | Root side | New spend charged |
|---|---|---|
BUY_CREATE_AND_ESCROW | Buyer | The gross value |
SELL_ACCEPT_ORIGINAL | Seller | None |
SELL_PROPOSE_REVISION | Seller | None |
BUY_REACCEPT_TERMS | Buyer | None |
BUY_CONFIRM_COMPLETION | Buyer | None |
A single session cannot act for both sides of a deal. Buyer and Seller automation need separate sessions, each created by its own Root.
What delegation never covers
No delegation grants cancellation, dispute opening or filing, arbitration votes, governance, or arbitrary escrow withdrawals. Dispute authority stays with the Roots themselves.
Completion can release escrow
Delegated buyer completion can release escrow even when the session spends nothing. Spend caps alone do not bound that release. Treat the completion action with the same care as spending.
Session lifetimes
| Lifetime | Behavior |
|---|---|
ONE_SHOT | The first successful delegated action uses up the session, even a zero-spend one. |
UNTIL_TIMESTAMP | Active only until a set time. |
NO_EXPIRY | No time cutoff. It must still have per-Atom and per-period caps, a profile scope and at least one specific counterparty, object or asset scope. |
Revoking authority
The Root can revoke one session, or revoke all sessions at once. Revocation looks forward only:
- It blocks later delegated actions.
- It does not cancel or rewrite an Atom that an earlier valid action created.
- It does not restore spent budget.
- It does not move funds out of an executor automatically.
- It does not disable the Root's own direct actions.
On a prefunded executor, the Root can recover the whole bound-token balance at any time. Nobody else can choose the recipient.
Why agent output is never authorization
An AI agent, a CAEM skill and an MCP server can all help prepare work. They cannot authorize it. Every skill package carries no authority effect. It can prepare proposals and evidence, but it cannot choose a Root wallet, sign an agreement, open an arbitration case, debit escrow or change ATP state.
The path from an agent to an effect has several independent checks:
untrusted source -> CAEM proposal -> human- or application-approved commercial artifact
-> bound Root and session -> guarded simulation -> guarded signing
-> on-chain verification -> read model and MCP evidenceFor the MCP server, six layers must each pass on their own:
| Layer | Question it answers |
|---|---|
| MCP OAuth | Is this identified client allowed to call this tool? |
| Application identity | Is this subject allowed to access this account or job? |
| Commercial binding | Does an approved artifact from the Root bind these exact terms? |
| ATP delegation | Is the on-chain session current and scoped for this action and value? |
| ATP state machine | Can this method run at this state and time? |
| Signer policy | Will the isolated signer send only its reviewed method and target? |
OAuth scopes are not ATP action masks. A Root session does not let anyone impersonate the application account, and it does not invent an order approval. If any layer is missing, the result is BLOCKED with zero chain effect.
The ATP MCP server is not deployed yet. It reads session facts from the chain. It does not decide that an action is allowed, and it never writes Atom state. See the MCP overview.
Practical rules
- Treat a sign-in as identity only. It never proves Root wallet control.
- Never let a model or default template fill a missing price, token, counterparty or expiry.
- Give each session the narrowest scope, value and lifetime that works.
- Revoke sessions you no longer need. Revocation stops future actions, not past ones.
- Verify on-chain facts, not an app's claim about them.